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Abstract 
 
In this paper, I want to hold, first, that a treatment of Frege cases in terms of a difference in 
cognitive phenomenology of the involved experiential mental states is not viable. Second, I 
will put forward another treatment of such cases that appeals to a difference in intentional 
objects metaphysically conceived not as exotica, but as schematic objects, i.e., as objects that 
have no metaphysical nature qua objects of thought. This allows their (possibly various) 
nature to be settled independently of their being thought-of, in particular as concrete entities 
in the sense of entities that may be spatiotemporal occupiers. Yet third, as to Frege cases 
cognitive phenomenology may return from the back door. For the realization that, if correct, 
solves any such case, cannot but have a proprietary, though neither distinctive nor 
individuative, phenomenology. In my account, this is the realization that the different 
schematic intentional objects involved are none other than the same entity. 
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Why Frege Cases Do Involve Cognitive Phenomenology but Only Indirectly 
 
Introduction 
 
In this paper, I want to hold, first, that a treatment of Frege cases in terms of a difference in 
cognitive phenomenology of the involved experiential mental states is not viable. Second, I 
will put forward another treatment of such cases that appeals to a difference in intentional 
objects metaphysically conceived not as exotica, but as schematic objects, i.e., as objects that 
have no metaphysical nature qua objects of thought. This allows their (possibly various) nature 
to be settled independently of their being thought-of, in particular as concrete entities in the 
sense of entities that may be spatiotemporal occupiers. Yet third, as to Frege cases cognitive 
phenomenology may return from the back door. For the realization that, if correct, solves any 
such case, cannot but have a proprietary, though neither distinctive nor individuative, 
phenomenology. In my account, this is the realization that the different schematic intentionalia 
involved are none other than the same entity. 
 
1. A treatment of Frege cases in terms of cognitive phenomenology 
 
Notoriously, Frege cases involve sentences of the form “a is b”, where “a” and “b” are supposed 
to be different yet coreferential singular terms (say, “Hesperus is Phosphorus”), in order to 
show that such sentences have a genuine cognitive value, unlike corresponding sentences of 
the form “a is a”, which contain two tokens of one and the same singular term thereby having 
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the same referential value (say, “Hesperus is Hesperus”). As Frege said, while sentences of the 
latter form are trivially true, to discover that a sentence of the former form is true is to make a 
genuine discovery about the world.1 Mutatis mutandis, the same holds of the corresponding 
thoughts. While a thought of the kind that a is a is trivially true, a thought of the kind that a is 
b, if true, amounts to a genuine discovery about the world to the effect that a is the same thing 
as b.2 As is well known, moreover, identity sentences or thoughts are not necessary in order to 
sketch a Frege case. A subject who accepts a sentence of the form “a is F” (say, “Afla is at least 
5000 meters high”), while rejecting a sentence of the form “b is F” (say, “Ateb is at least 5000 
meters high”), where “a” and “b” are again supposed to be different yet coreferential singular 
terms (“Afla” and “Ateb” in the above example), gives a different cognitive value to such 
sentences.3 Likewise, consider a subject who endorses a thought of the kind that a is F while 
rejecting a thought of the kind that b is F, even if a is the same thing as b. This subject entertains 
thoughts endowed with different cognitive value. Or even more radically, that cognitive 
difference also affects a subject who endorses a merely objectual thought about a (say, 
Oedipus’ craving Jocasta), while rejecting another such thought about b (say, Oedipus’ craving 
Mummy), when again a is the same thing as b. 
According to Kriegel (2011), one must appeal to cognitive phenomenology in order to account 
for the cognitive difference that Frege cases mobilize. For him, indeed, the difference in the 
involved thoughts is first of all a difference in phenomenology, at least when such thoughts are 
the mental states par excellence for him; namely, experiential states, i.e., states one is aware 
of. For that difference amounts to a difference in the experiential character of such thoughts, in 
the experiential ‘what it is like’ of such states. Moreover, it is a difference in cognitive 
phenomenology, for such thoughts differ in a nonsensory component of their experiential 
character. For him, on the one hand, one may indeed be aware of a without being aware of b 
even though a is the same thing as b, insofar as one entertains different experiences of 
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recognition of that thing as a and of the very same thing as b. On the other hand, that difference 
in recognitional experiences is cognitive, not sensory. The two thoughts in question do not have 
to differ in any sensory feature.4 
As to the first part of Kriegel’s story, the one concerning a difference in phenomenology, it is 
just an episode of his overall appeal to phenomenal intentionality. The thesis that intentionality 
is phenomenal, or in alternative terminology experiential, says Kriegel, is the thesis that 
experiential mental states have their intentionality (their being about something or they having 
a certain, truth-sensitive, content) in virtue of their having a certain experiential character.5 
Now, the fact that one can endorse a thought about a while rejecting another such thought about 
b, even if a is the same thing as b, is normally taken to show what the aspectuality feature of 
thoughts consists in. Roughly, thought aspectuality is the fact that a subject thinks of an object 
under a certain aspect, or, in an alternative formulation, as an aspect of something else.6 
Moreover, aspectuality is standardly taken as constituting one of the features that characterize 
intentionality.7 So, it is not surprising that a believer in phenomenal, or experiential, 
intentionality holds that aspectuality is a matter of experiential character. 
What is more characteristic is the second part of Kriegel’s story, namely the fact that for him 
aspectuality consists in a nonsensory component of experiential character. To prove that it is 
so, Kriegel presents the following thought experiment. One and the same subject, he holds, can 
endorse an experience about Hesperus without endorsing an experience about Phosphorus even 
if, unlike the traditional story involving the planet Venus as seen in the evening and that planet 
again yet as seen in the morning, she faces Venus from the very same sensory perspective. The 
point is, he goes on saying, that that subject entertains a Hesperescent as well as a different 
Phosporescent cognitive experience of recognition, i.e., she both recognizes Venus as Hesperus 
and recognizes it as Phosphorus, without however realizing that it is the same thing she 
recognizes in such different cognitive experiences.8 
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I certainly agree with Kriegel that a Frege case involving experiential mental states must be 
accounted for in terms of a cognitive, not of a sensory, factor. Incidentally, to complicate the 
situation, unlike Kriegel’s example, not even the names involved in the relevant Frege case 
must be different.  One and the same subject can fail to realize that the object a she is aware of 
in a certain experience is the same as the object b she is aware of in another experience, even 
though she experiences both a and b from the very same sensory perspective and she names 
them in the same way. This is a radical variant of a Kripkean “Paderewski” case.9 The relevant 
subject endorses a certain experience about a, by naming it “Paderewski”, yet she fails to 
endorse another experience about b, which is given to her under the same sensory perspective 
as a and yet she names it again “Paderewski”, for she merely has the false belief that a is not 
the same thing as b – because e.g. she entertains the paranoid general suspicion that objects 
may always be replaced by their Doppelgänger, or even by fakes utterly looking alike them.10  
Yet pace Kriegel, this cognitive factor cannot amount to a difference in experiences of 
recognition. For such experiences have a perceptual nature, so that they can only differ 
perceptually, not cognitively. Or so I will argue. 
To begin with, as Wittgenstein originally underlined, experiences of recognition are 
experiences that mobilize grouping properties, namely properties for the elements of the 
experienced item involved to be organized in a certain way, i.e., along a certain direction in a 
spatial dimension. Recognizing a face in certain traits, says Wittgenstein, indeed amounts to 
grouping such traits in a certain way, i.e., along a certain direction in a spatial dimension. 
 
I observe a face, and then suddenly notice its likeness to another. I see that it has not changed; and yet 
I see it differently. I call this experience ‘noticing an aspect’. (20094, II xi, §113) 
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I suddenly see the solution of a puzzle-picture. Where there were previously branches, now there is a 
human figure. My visual impression has changed, and now I recognize that it has not only shape and 
colour, but also a quite particular ‘organization’. (20094, II xi, §131) 
 
As the previous quotations show, grouping properties are higher-order perceptual properties. 
Definitely, they are perceptual properties, for at least two different reasons. First, grouping 
properties qualify the nonconceptual content of the relevant perception. As many cases of 
Gestalt switches show, primarily the merely 2D ones (those that involve no pictorial 
perception), one can perceptually group a certain 2D figure, e.g. the so-called Mach figure, 
either in a certain way, e.g., as a diamond, or in another way, e.g., as a tilted square, even if 
one does not possess the relevant concepts.11 Second, grouping properties are responsible for 
many features that qualify such Gestalt switches, namely: exclusivity (the multistable percepts 
in a Gestalt switch are not given simultaneously), inevitability (one interpretation in that switch 
will eventually replace another) and randomness (the duration of one alternation in that switch 
is not a function of previous durations).12 Yet they are higher-order perceptual properties, for 
they may differ even if the basic perceptual properties – colors, shapes – remain the same. 
Gestalt switches again, in the cases this time not only of merely 2D ambiguous figures such as 
the Mach figure but also of ambiguous 3D pictures such as the duck-rabbit picture, 
paradigmatically show this point. In that switch, the grouping properties of the involved item’s 
elements change even though its colors and shapes don’t. As Wittgenstein remarks: 
 
The color in the visual impression corresponds to the color of the object (this blotting paper looks pink 
to me, and is pink) —– the shape in the visual impression to the shape of the object (it looks rectangular 
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to me, and is rectangular) —– but what I perceive in the lighting up of an aspect is not a property of the 
object, but an internal relation between it and other objects. (20094, II xi, § 247)13 
 
Hence, grouping properties make a perceptual difference in the experiences grasping them: no 
difference in experiences of grouping properties without a difference in the perceptual 
character of such experiences. Now as we have seen, experiences of recognition are other 
experiences where grouping properties are involved. Thus, one cannot pass from having a 
recognitional experience of a certain object as a to having a recognitional experience of that 
object as b without entertaining a perceptual change in one’s experience: different grouping 
properties are there involved. Yet we have agreed with Kriegel that Frege cases involving 
experiential states must involve no perceptual shift. Thus, difference in experiences of 
recognition cannot account for such cases. 
Kriegel might attempt to equate the difference in experiential character that allegedly accounts 
for thought aspectuality with another nonsensory component of that character. Yet that attempt 
must face an even more radical problem. The cognitive differential factor that Frege cases 
involve cannot even be a difference in cognitive experiences. Or so I will argue. 
The new problem is that Frege cases can occur across both experiential and nonexperiential 
mental states. In other terms, one may think both occurrently and nonoccurrently of object a 
without realizing that a is the same as another object b she again thinks both occurrently and 
nonoccurrently. One may endorse both a certain experience and a dispositional thought about 
a, and then again endorse both a certain experience and a dispositional thought about b, while 
failing to realize that a is the same thing as b. Regardless of their being a conscious and an 
unconscious thought respectively, the first pair of mental states have the same aspectuality; 
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likewise as to the second pair of mental states; yet the first and the second pair differ in their 
respective aspectuality. 
Let me give an example of this situation by exploiting again a radical “Paderewski” case, where 
no sensory difference occurs in one’s failing to recognize that (the first) Paderewski is the same 
as (the second) Paderewski. Suppose, first, that at a certain time a subject consciously assents 
to what she has unconsciously endorsed all along, namely that (the first) Paderewski is a person. 
In actual fact, that very endorsement has remained nonoccurrent for a long while, by merely 
displaying itself in the subject’s own behavior, before coming at a certain point to that subject’s 
mind. Second, suppose that, at that time, that very subject also consciously dissents from 
another thing she has unconsciously endorsed all along, namely that (the second) Paderewski 
is a person, possibly because she is caught by the paranoid general suspicion that persons can 
always be replaced by perceptually identical fakes. Definitely, the first pair of mental states 
shares a certain aspectuality, while the second pair shares another aspectuality. Yet the 
members of both pairs are such that one is an experiential mental state while the other is not. 
Thus, the cognitive factor of difference accounting for Frege cases, whatever it is, covers both 
experiential and nonexperiential thoughts, thereby showing that aspectuality may also occur in 
nonexperiential mental states.  
In order to reject this conclusion, Kriegel may perform two moves. Yet neither works, as we 
will now see.  
To begin with, Kriegel may deny that nonexperiential thoughts exhibit Frege cases, by 
refraining from ascribing aspectuality to such thoughts: only experiential thoughts can have 
aspectuality. Yet this is Searle’s (1992) move he already criticized in a previous paper.14 This 
move is indeed implausible: relevant differences in agential behavior may well depend on the 
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agent’s having different nonexperiential thoughts that she fails to recognize as involving the 
same thing.  
The above radical “Paderewski” case already shows this point. In failing to recognize that (the 
first) Paderewski is the same thing as (the second) Paderewski, the subject in question acts 
differently on the basis of her unconscious endorsement on the one hand and of her unconscious 
failure of endorsement on the other hand. Yet the point may also be shown by appealing to 
unconscious perceptions. Let me suitably adapt a real example involving pictures and 
heminegligent subjects, i.e., persons who fail to consciously perceive what they face in the left-
hand side part of their visual field.15 Suppose that one such subject faces a house when its left-
hand side is burning and then faces the same house again when no burning occurs at all (see 
the following two figures), while however supposing for some reason that she faces different 
things, so that a new house has replaced the previous one. 
                
If one asked to that subject whether she sees differences in what she perceives (actually, the 
same house), she would negatively answer the question: she consciously grasps only the right-
hand sides of the house(s), which ex hypothesi make no difference in her visual field. As far as 
her aware perception is concerned, she indeed sees no difference. Yet if that subject is asked 
in which house she would like to live, she answers (what she takes to be) the second house, the 
non-burning one. Thus, she unconsciously grasps the differences in aspectuality her two 
perceptions mobilize.  
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On second thought, that aspectuality is indifferent to awareness is not astonishing at all. For 
aspectuality has not to do with subjective perspective – basically, how objects phenomenally 
look to subjects – but rather with objective perspective – how objects are given from 
geometrical points of view, from the points of origin of the involved perceptions (or other 
mental states) occurring in the relevant subject. Indeed, objective perspective has nothing to do 
with the phenomenal look of an object that qualifies one’s experience of it, for it rather captures 
the so-called outline shape of an object, i.e., the solid angle circumscribed by the straight lines 
one can trace from the perceiver’s ideal eye to an object’s contours.16 Definitely, outline shape 
is a mind-dependent property, for if one changes the point of origin from which one grasps 
something, the outline shape of that very something changes as well. Yet this mind-dependence 
is a weak, not a strong, form of dependence. For outline shape is also an objective property, it 
is a property of the experienced objects, insofar as it has nothing to do with any phenomenal 
feature concerning how that something looks to a subject; in particular, there is nothing 
particularly visual in outline shape.17 Now, differences in outline shape definitely affect 
differences in aspectuality. In a very famous example, a coin that is elliptical from one objective 
perspective, i.e., that has a certain outline shape, may not be recognized as the same thing that 
is round from another such perspective, i.e., that has another outline shape.18 So, aspectuality 
may be possessed by unconscious perceptions that are still entertained from geometrical points 
of view, from certain points of origin. In the above example, even if the point of origin is fixed, 
the house a subject faces is given to her under different contours – the flamed vs. the non-
flamed one – that determine the different outline shapes that are traced from that very point to 
that house. 
At this point, Kriegel may try to perform the second move I hinted at, i.e., to deny that the same 
cognitive factor of difference accounts both for experiential and nonexperiential thoughts.  
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Yet the above radical “Paderewski” case shows that even that move is doomed to fail. For in 
that case there is an anaphoric link we have no reason not to take at face value – one consciously 
assents to WHAT one unconsciously believed – which suggests that the aspectuality of the 
relevant experiential thought (the one involving (the first) Paderewski, viz. Paderewski from 
that perspective) is the same as the aspectuality of the relevant nonexperiential thought (the 
one involving again (the first) Paderewski, viz. Paderewski from the very same perspective). 
Mutatis mutandis, the same holds as to the conscious dissent and the unconscious disbelief 
concerning (the second) Paderewski, viz. Paderewski from the other perspective. 
In order to defend his second move, following Searle (1992) Kriegel might reply that in the 
above pairs the first member of the pair, the nonoccurrent thought, has a derived aspectuality, 
while the second member of the pair, the occurrent thought, has original aspectuality. Since 
the former thought is unconscious, it borrows its aspectuality from the latter thought, which 
bears aspectuality on its sleeves - just as a picture of Hesperus borrows its aspectuality from an 
experience of Hesperus, and likewise for a picture and an experience of Phosphorus.19  
Yet even if we allowed for that difference between an occurrent and a nonoccurrent thought – 
which is rather controversial – this would not determine the cognitive difference between a 
conscious and an unconscious mental state Kriegel is looking for. For he should acknowledge 
that it is the same property, the same aspectuality, that the two thoughts in question share, by 
simply being ascribed to them in different ways. As always happens not only as far as original 
vs. derived aspectuality are concerned, but also as far as any original F vs. derived F are 
concerned. A king instantiates regality by her own sake; a vice-king instantiates regality 
because it is conventionally ascribed to her. Yet the two Majesties instantiate the very same 
property, regality, though in different ways. Mutatis mutandis, the same holds of original and 
derived aspectuality. 
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Kriegel may try to counter this objection by applying to original vs. derived aspectuality what 
he says concerning original vs. derived intentionality in general. For him, original and derived 
intentionality can indifferently be taken either as different properties or as different modes of 
entertaining the very same property, intentionalilty. For, he says, such accounts are 
interdefinable: having such different properties is the same as having a genus, intentionality, in 
different ways.20 So, having intentionality in the derived way is for a thought the same as having 
a certain property, while having intentionality in the original way is for a thought to have 
another property. Mutatis mutandis, the same should hold of aspectuality. 
Yet this rejoinder does not work. For taken as a mode difference, the difference between 
original and derived F, whatever F is, is not a difference in the ways for F to be possessed, but 
rather in the ways for F to be ascribed. Thus, for F to be derived is not the same as for 
something to possess a species of a more general property. 
 
2. From cognitive experiences to intentional objects 
 
My previous distinction between subjective and objective perspective actually gestures towards 
a general reason as to why Kriegel’s strategy to account for Frege cases does not work. That 
strategy attempts at reconstructing a Fregean difference of modes of presentation between 
experiences as a difference in terms of manners of presentation of such experiences, notably 
as a difference in the experiential character of such experiences. Yet, as Chalmers (2004) 
originally noted, one cannot account for a difference of modes in terms of a difference of 
manners. On the one hand, manners of presentation concern the modality of an experiential 
mental state. Insofar as that state is experiential, they have to do with the subjective matter of 
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how the state with its experiential features presents itself to its subject, by displaying to her 
certain worldly properties – by letting them have, within that subject’s experience, a 
phenomenal look. On the other hand, modes of presentation concern an objective matter of that 
state, insofar as they can be traced back to objective perspectives viz. outline shapes of the 
experienced objects.  
It is now wise to look for other strategies in order to account for the cognitive difference that 
thoughts involved in the Frege cases mobilize. An interesting alternative is to treat modes of 
presentation in terms of mental files. Nowadays, this strategy seems in the literature to be highly 
appealing. A mental file is supposed to be a nondescriptive repository which, when 
appropriately labeled with a certain mental tag, stores information about an object in a subject’s 
mind.21 If one appeals to mental files, one can account for Frege cases as follows. A subject 
opens different mental files that however are, unbeknownst to her, related to the very same 
object. For instance, in the normal Hesperus-Phosphorus case, a subject opens both a certain 
file about Venus that in her mind is labeled “Hesperus” and contains the information being the 
evening star and another file again about Venus that in her mind is labeled “Phosphorus” and 
contains the information being the morning star. She however fails to know that both files are 
about the same object, Venus. When that subject comes to know that Hesperus is Phosphorus, 
she merges the two files into a new single one that is labeled “Venus” and contains information 
coming from those files. Or more cautiously – for one may always wonder whether that 
sameness really holds – she keeps both files yet she links the information contained in either 
file to that of the other file.22  
In the above way, this strategy accounts for the difference in cognitive value that Frege cases 
involve without appealing at all to differences in cognitive phenomenology. In this, I think that 
the strategy is on the right track. Nevertheless, I wonder whether it is altogether correct. For if 
we come back to the Frege case I sketched before, the above radical “Paderewski” case, it is 
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hard to account for the difference in question in terms of a difference in mental files. For in 
that case the two mental files allegedly in question not only contain exactly the same 
information but they are also labeled in the same way – “Paderewski”.23 A believer in mental 
files might perhaps reply that the files are nevertheless different for they are opened in different 
times. Yet even this feature of the story is not essential. One may reconceive the situation in 
question as involving a deluded subject whose present perception is hallucinatorily split in two, 
so that she assumes at one and the same time that she confronts herself with two perfectly alike 
Paderewskis, while not even being able to distinguish those guys by locating them in different 
portions of the space she is facing. She merely wonders whether the (first) Paderewski she 
seems to see at a certain time is the same as the (second) Paderewski she seems to see at that 
very time even if, as to those Paderewskis, there is no bit of information that differs.24 More 
problematically, the subject’s coming to know that (the first) Paderewski is the same as (the 
second) Paderewski cannot be accounted for either in terms of file merging or in terms of file 
linking. For, since the information that the two files should contain is allegedly the same, there 
is neither merging nor linking of that information. The only justification one has in that case 
for holding that different files are opened is just that the subject involved assumes that she deals 
in her thoughts with different objects. So, why not taking straightforwardly this assumption 
into account?25 
Indeed, I take that this radical “Paderewski” case reveals so to speak the essence of Frege cases, 
what all such cases have in common. So, in order to be able to account for such cases, one must 
be able to account for this very case. Now, as I just hinted at, if one reflects more carefully on 
that case, it turns out that the only relevant cognitive difference around is that the involved 
subject takes her first thought to be about a different entity from the entity she takes her second 
thought to be about.26 Thus, why don’t we take that assumption seriously, by holding that the 
entity the subject is firstly thinking about is really different from the entity she is secondly 
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thinking about? In order to do that I will suppose, first, that the subject in question really 
entertains different intentional objects in her thoughts, and second, that once she comes to know 
the truth about her cognitive situation, what she discovers is that those intentionalia are (in 
some sense) nothing but the same thing. 
In order to make this supposition plausible, two moves must be performed. First, I must appeal 
to a satisfying metaphysical conception of what an intentionale is; that is, a conception that 
does not fall under those approaches that appeal to differences in intentionalia in terms of 
differences in problematic Meinongian objects, or any other sort of bizarre entities: exotica, in 
Sainsbury’s (2010) terms. As we will see, thata metaphysical move has certain ontological 
consequences. Second, in order to legitimately say that different intentionalia are discovered 
to be the same thing, I must mobilize a notion of sameness that is both different from and 
weaker than the ordinary notion of identity. Let me consider these two moves in turn. 
To begin with, following Crane (2001), I take that an intentionale is a schematic object: that 
is, the object a thought is directed upon that has no metaphysical nature insofar as it is thought-
of. According to this characterization, an intentionale is not a metaphysically peculiar 
Meinongian object, nor any metaphysically bizarre entity either. Rather, it is an object whose 
metaphysical nature, if any, is settled independently of the fact that that object is thought-of. 
In this respect, it may turn out that different intentionalia have different natures.27 For instance, 
in mentally contemplating Elizabeth II one may think both of the present UK Majesty and of 
number Two. Both Elizabeth II and number Two are intentionalia of such thoughts insofar as 
they simply are what those thoughts are directed upon. Qua schematic intentionalia, they have 
no metaphysical nature insofar as they are thought-of. This does not prevent them from having 
a nature independently of their being thought-of. Actually, that nature is a very different one 
respectively: the first object is a concrete entity, a person, the second object is an abstract entity, 
a number. 
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This metaphysical way of putting things has an ontological consequence. In the overall domain 
of what there is, we find just those intentionalia whose nature is such that we are ontologically 
committed to entities of that nature. The thoughts that are about intentionalia whose nature is 
such that we are not committed to objects of that nature involve no relation at all to those 
objects, for there really are no such objects. If one is thinking both of Elizabeth II and of her 
Freudian superego, one may say that her thought is directed upon to both Elizabeth and her 
superego, for both are the intentionalia of that thought. Yet in the overall domain of what there 
is we allow for concreta but not for superegos, which are just false scientific posits having 
incompatible determinations (e.g., having both a neural realization and no such realization). 
Thus, we are ontologically committed to Elizabeth, for her Majesty is a concretum, but we are 
not so committed to her superego, for it is just such a false theoretical posit.28 
In particular, among the entities we are ontologically committed to there are mere possibilia, 
i.e., entities that do not actually exist even though they might have existed.29 For, as 
Cocchiarella (1982) maintained, both mere possibilia and actual possibilia, possible entities 
that actually exist, are entities of the same metaphysical nature: namely, concreta again, i.e., 
entities that may be spatiotemporal occupiers. If this is the case, to allow for actual possibilia 
while dispensing with mere possibilia is just false parsimony.30 
As we will now see, in fact, the above metaphysico-ontological move sets the stage in order 
for me to perform my second move, namely, to understand the Frege cases in terms of a 
difference in schematic intentionalia that are however also such that may be discovered to be 
(in some sense) the same. To begin with, the schematic intentionalia that are involved in the 
Frege cases turn out precisely to be mere possibilia. Now, if one appeals to schematic 
intentionalia that are mere possibilia, one may indeed appeal to a difference in such objects in 
accounting for Frege cases. For what primarily happens in Frege cases is that in facing a certain 
entity, one thinks both of a certain schematic intentionale a that is a certain mere possibile and 
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of another schematic intentionale b that is another mere possibile. This way of putting things 
matches appearances: for the subject involved, her thoughts are about different objects.  
Yet moreover, the above way of putting things immediately prompts the following question: 
what happens when one comes to know that a certain schematic intentionale a is the same as 
another schematic intentionale b? For me, what is involved here is an aspectuality resolution, 
in that the objects in question appear to be mere aspects of another object, where aspectuality 
is basically conceived in the terms seen in the previous Section; namely, they appear to be mere 
outline shapes of another object. In a nutshell, the former objects are none other than the latter 
object. Now, let me take this last way of talking seriously: being for some schematic 
intentionalia to be none other than another object is for the former objects to stand in a certain 
relation of sameness with the latter object that differs from ordinary identity. In other and more 
detailed terms, one has to understand the relation for some schematic intentionalia of being 
none other than another object that aspectuality resolution involves as a relation of ontological 
contraction that is both different from and weaker than ordinary identity.  
To begin with, ontological contraction is a many-one relation, in that it may involve more than 
one object as its first relatum, just one object as its second relatum: either one or infinitely 
many schematic intentionalia may ontologically contract itself/themselves to another object. 
In Frege cases that we would intuitively consider as cases of disguised identity, as when one 
discovers that (pretending that the story is true) Batman is Bruce Wayne, we have only two 
objects involved, where the former is a schematic intentionale that ontologically contracts itself 
to the latter. In the normal Frege cases, such as the standard Hesperus-Phosphorus one, we have 
two schematic intentionalia, Hesperus and Phosphorus, which ontologically contract 
themselves to a third object, the planet Venus. Yet nothing prevents us from imagining further, 
more complicated, cases in which the objects involved are more than three: e.g. a case in which 
a subject not only thinks of Hesperus and Phosphorus but also of Meridius, the noon star, and 
19 
 
of Postmeridius, the afternoon star, by finally discovering that not only Hesperus and 
Phosphorus, but also Meridius and Postmeridius are none other than Venus. 
A definition of ontological contraction is now in order. An object(s) is (are) none other than 
another object iff i) the former object(s) fail(s) to exist(s) even if it (they) might, while the latter 
object exists, even if it might not; ii) for any contingent, existence-entailing and individual 
property (i.e., a property that cannot be exemplified by more than one object at a given time), 
which could be falsely attributed to the former object(s) in the erroneous conviction that it 
(they) existed, this property is possessed either by the latter object or by nothing.  
As a consequence of this definition, all the objects involved by ontological contraction are 
possibilia, hence concreta according to the aforementioned characterization. Yet the left-hand 
side relata of ontological contraction are mere possibilia, for they do not actually exist although 
they might have existed, while the only right-hand side relatum of that relation is an actual 
possibile, for it actually exists.  
In the above definition, moreover, clause i) accounts for the contingency of the relation. In a 
possible unactual world in which a certain actually nonexistent schematic intentionale exists, 
it is ontologically contracted to nothing else. It may be the case e.g. that our different actually 
nonexistent schematic intentionalia Hesperus and Phosphorus exist; in the possible world this 
supposition mobilizes, they do not ontologically contract to Venus at all.  
As is well known, for Kripke the possibility that Hesperus is not the same as Phosphorus is an 
epistemic possibility. Yet not only, as Kripke acknowledges,31 it is an epistemic possibility that 
is also the metaphysical possibility that sketches a possible world is which a given subject is in 
the identical epistemic status as she is in the actual world, but for the fact that she is confronted 
there with an objectual triad Hesperus – Phosphorus - Venus. But also, the epistemic states 
there involved are identical with the actual ones for they precisely mobilize the very same 
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schematic intentionalia. Those schematic intentionalia, Hesperus and Phosphorus do not 
actually exist for they here ontologically contract themselves to Venus. Yet they exist in that 
possible world, while entertaining there no ontological contraction with Venus.  
To be sure, one might wonder whether the merely possible objects that are involved in that 
metaphysical possibility are respectively identical with the nonexistent objects the relevant 
subject actually thinks about. One might rather say that the two cognitively identical 
crossworld situations mobilize, for the subject involved, the very same epistemic states as in 
the actual world, respectively having just the very same narrow, non-‘object involving’, 
content, which in the possible world in question respectively picks out a new item existing 
there: the first state has a narrow content that picks out a certain Hesperus there, the second 
state has another narrow content that picks out a certain other Phosphorus there. In other words, 
that subject crossworldly represents things in the same way, by entertaining the very same, 
nonrelationally individuated, content in each such representations respectively, even though by 
means of them she faces a new existing something (a different one respectively) in that possible 
world. Yet once I allow for intentionalia as schematic objects, we need no appeal to the 
theoretical notion of narrow content. The cognitive identity involved both by the actual and by 
the possible situation may be grasped in terms of the respective identity in the schematic 
intentionalia that are both actually thought about although they do not actually exist and are 
possibly perceived, so that they exist merely possibly. One actually thinks of the Hesperus that 
possibly perceives; likewise as to Phosphorus. Clearly enough, if supposing that Hesperus is 
not Phosphorus were to suppose that Venus is not identical with itself, that supposition would 
not amount to a metaphysical possibility at all, as Kripke stresses: there is no chance for an 
object not to be identical with itself.32 But pace Kripke, this is not the supposition in question. 
Furthermore, clause ii) of the above definition accounts for the aspectuality of a contracted 
schematic intentionale. As to all the contingent, existence-entailing and individual properties 
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that were ascribed to a schematic intentionale in the erroneous conviction that it existed, they 
either belong to the existent object that schematic intentionale is ontologically contracted to or 
belong to nothing. Moreover, given i), this aspectuality is just apparent; in worlds where a 
schematic intentionale is not contracted to another object, the worlds in which it exists, it does 
not even appear to be an aspect of that object (or of any other object for that matter). 
According to this definition, ontological contraction is not only different from ordinary 
identity, as its being a many-one relation already shows, but it is also weaker than ordinary 
identity, for it is not an equivalence relation.  
Firstly, ontological contraction is neither reflexive nor symmetric. For an entity cannot contract 
itself to itself, on pain of existing and nonexisting at the same time. Nor, if an entity contracts 
itself to another entity, does the latter contract itself to the former, for the very same reason: 
symmetry would require that both entities existed and did not exist at the same time. Secondly, 
the relation is certainly transitive, but only vacuously. If a is none other than b and b is none 
other than c, then a is none other than c, yet one of the two conjuncts in the above antecedent 
is false, so that the very antecedent is false as well. For if a is none other than b, then b exists, 
so it is not the case that b is none other than c; whereas if b is none other than c, then it does 
not exist, so it is not the case that a is none other than b. 
Granted, this account of the Frege cases evokes some Meinongian accounts of them.  
According to such accounts, the known fact that a is b mobilizes a sameness relation that 
involves different intentionalia and is weaker than identity. This relation is either a relation of 
consubstantiation – different Meinongian objects are consubstantiated as facets of the very 
same massive entity (Castañeda 1989) – or a relation of coexemplification – different 
Meinongian objects are exemplified by the very same ordinary individual (Zalta 1988), where 
Meinongian objects respectively are either one-one correlates of property sets or something 
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like Platonic attributes. In the Hesperus-Phosphorus case, we would thus have either that the 
Meinongian object the morning star is consubstantiated with the different Meinongian object 
the evening star as facets of the same massive object, Venus, or that the first Meinongian object 
and the second Meinongian object are coexemplified by an ordinary individual, Venus. 
Clearly, such Meinongian accounts of the Frege cases have the same explanatory strength as 
my present account, for they also take appearances at face value. For all such accounts, a 
subject correctly thinks that her first thought is about a different thing from what her second 
thought is about, insofar as she really entertains different intentionalia in such thoughts.  
Yet metaphysically speaking the intentionalia that are involved in the Meinongian accounts 
are Meinongian entities, exotica in Sainsbury’s sense, not schematic objects as those I am 
appealing to here. Thus, my account is better than those ones, for in accepting it one does not 
have to endorse a bizarre metaphysics. One simply has to allow from an ontological point of 
view for mere possibilia. For as I said before, the schematic intentionalia that are involved as 
left-hand side members of the relation of ontological contraction metaphysically are possible 
entities that simply do not actually exist. Yet, since such entities belong to the same 
metaphysical kind as actual possibilia, for all of them are concreta, to dispense with them 
would be false parsimony.33 
 
3. Cognitive phenomenology comes back from the rear door 
 
Whatever the merits of the above account, Frege cases involving experiential states turn out 
not to be explained in terms of a difference in cognitive phenomenology. Does this mean that 
cognitive phenomenology has nothing to do with those cases? Not quite. That phenomenology 
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is indirectly involved by these cases. For one’s (possibly mistaken)34 realization that a is the 
same as b cannot be an unconscious thought, but it amounts to an ‘aha’-experience (in the terms 
Mulligan 1988 made popular) of a cognitive kind.35 
The argument as to why realizing that a is the same as b cannot be an unconscious thought is 
simple. First, that realization prompts a behavioral change in the realizing subject. Consider 
what happened to poor Oedipus when he realized that Jocasta was the same as Mummy. 
Second, that change must fall under report awareness, for it is not a change prompted by 
internal unconscious drives. Imagine again Oedipus’ noticing that he is no longer sexually 
attracted by Jocasta, but he does not know why. Here we have a behavioral change that may 
well depend on some Oedipus’ internal, unconscious, change in his conative dispositions. Yet 
this is not the kind of change that follows his realization that Jocasta is the same as Mummy. 
For the first kind of change requires in the subject affected by it no stance as to the sameness 
of the individual responsible for that change, while the latter kind of change requires a subject 
to realize that what were two things turn out in some sense to be one. In order for that realization 
to be performed, it must be an aware one.36 
Now, if that realization has a phenomenally cognitive import, what kind of import is it? David 
Pitt (2004, 2011) has maintained that a cognitive phenomenology must be proprietary – a sui 
generis one, proper to occurrent thoughts rather than to other kinds of mental experiential states 
– distinctive – distinct types of occurrent thoughts have distinct cognitive phenomenal 
properties – and individuative – in virtue of its having the experiential properties it has, the 
occurrent thought having it has a specific intentional content. Is this the case also with our 
realizations of sameness? 
To begin with, the first feature, proprietaryness, is certainly ascribable to our sameness 
realizations. As I said, they are ‘aha’-experiences. In this respect, their cognitive 
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phenomenology is a sui generis one, to be told not only from the different forms of sensory 
phenomenology but also from the different forms of cognitive phenomenology that feelings, 
moods or other sorts of cognitive states may involve.  
Yet moreover, the second feature, distinctiveness, is hardly ascribable to such realizations. 
Granted, different experiences of the same sensory genus – say, different exteroceptive 
experiences in the same sensory modality (e.g., gustatory sensations), different proprioceptive 
experiences of the same general kind (e.g., kinaesthetic sensations), and different interoceptive 
sensations of the same general kind (e.g., different pains) instantiate different kinds of such 
sensations insofar as they are felt differently, as Pitt says.37 Yet by hypothesis no such 
qualitative feeling is involved in realizing that, say, Hesperus is the same as Phosphorus, vs. 
realizing that, say, Jocasta is the same as Mummy, for we have acknowledged that, whatever 
it is, one such realization is not sensory. Then how can we ground the idea that such realizations 
are typologically distinctive? There is no relevant parameter of similarity between the above 
sensory cases and the nonsensory cases of sameness realizations in order for the argument by 
analogy Pitt implicitly appeals to go through. If sensations of different kinds are phenomenally 
different, so are sameness realizations of different kinds, insofar as the latter are phenomenally 
similar to the former, Pitt seems to argue. Yet since the former have a qualitative 
phenomenology that the latter lack, there is no real phenomenal similarity between the former 
and the latter. 
Quite on the contrary, another model naturally suggests itself that involves no distinctiveness 
for the sameness realizations. Consider e.g. the nonsensory feeling of awakeness. One may feel 
of being awake now, and one may again feel of being awake a minute from now. Yet such 
different temporal locations prompt no phenomenal difference in the ‘what it is like’ of the 
feeling of awareness: one just still feels to be awake – unlike, say, when one is going to fall 
asleep, where that feeling dims up to its complete evaporation. Likewise, although as far as 
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their intentional propositional content is concerned, realizing that, say, Hesperus is the same as 
Phosphorus is quite different from realizing that, say, Jocasta is the same as Mummy – in my 
account, different schematic intentionalia are respectively involved – the two realizations have 
the same experiential character. Granted, I have here implicitly relied on another argument by 
analogy: if nonsensory feelings of different kinds are phenomenally identical, so are sameness 
realizations of different kinds, insofar as the latter are phenomenally similar to the former. Yet 
that argument may work, for the compared experiences share the relevant similarity parameter; 
namely, their both being phenomenally nonsensory. 
Finally, if the above is the case, then of course the phenomenology of our realizations cannot 
even be ascribed the third feature, individuativity. For the very same experiential character 
rather corresponds to different intentional propositional contents of the occurrent thoughts 
involved, sameness realizations in this case. Thus, it cannot obviously account for their having 
the different content they have.38 
Pitt would reply that his main argument in favour of his claim that the cognitive 
phenomenology here involved is proprietary as well as distinctive and individuative appeals to 
the kind of introspective acquaintance with an occurrent thought – in our case, a sameness 
realization – that enables one to be immediately aware of that thought. According to this 
argument, one is able to identify via that acquaintance an occurrent thought as the thought it is 
(that is, one is able not only to distinguish it from any other occurrent mental states she 
entertains, her other occurrent thoughts included, but also to identify it as the particular thought 
it is endowed with a certain intentional content). Yet one could not be so able unless that 
thought had a cognitive phenomenology that is not only proprietary, but also distinctive and 
individuative. Hence, that thought has that phenomenology.39 
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Yet in order for this argument to go through, one has again to rely on a disputable analogy 
between occurrent thoughts and sensory mental states. True enough, in order to identify via 
immediate awareness a sensory mental state as the state it is, one must be able to grasp the 
qualitative phenomenological property that makes it different from any other such state. When 
sipping a glass of Burgundy, one can identify via introspective acquaintance her present 
headache while simultaneously telling it from her kinaesthetic sensation affecting her lips as 
well as from her tasting that wine. For such immediate awareness of that headache is the 
awareness of the qualitative phenomenological property that makes that headache the sensory 
state it is. Now, let us well suppose that in being introspectively acquainted with an occurrent 
thought, one grasps the nonqualitative phenomenal property that thought admittedly has. Yet 
it is not in virtue of that grasping that she immediately identifies that thought, unless it has been 
already established that it is precisely that property that makes that thought differ from any 
other occurrent thoughts of hers, rather than a different property, typically its having the 
intentional content it has. Yet this was what the argument was supposed to prove.40 
To see the point, consider the following case. Russell once thought that one may be 
immediately aware of universals.41 If this were true, then the fact that one is immediately aware, 
say, of the Bold as different from the Beautiful would have to do not with the phenomenological 
properties, if any, that are involved in the first and in the second awareness respectively, but 
rather with what makes the Bold be a different universal from the Beautiful. Mutatis mutandis, 
the same holds as to occurrent thoughts in general and to our sameness realizations in particular. 
If what essentially constitutes the realization that Jocasta is the same as Mummy and the 
realization that Laius is the same as Daddy that poor Oedipus discovered at one and the same 
time is their respective different intentional propositional contents, the fact that Oedipus 
identifies via introspective acquaintance the first realization as different from the second has to 
do not with the proprietary phenomenology of such realizations, which is admittedly identical, 
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but with the distinct intentional propositional contents of such realizations that make such 
realizations be different thoughts.42 
Let me take stock. Frege cases involving experiential mental states cannot be straightforwardly 
accounted for in terms of a difference of cognitive phenomenology. The cognitive difference 
they mobilize can be alternatively accounted for in terms of a difference in the schematic 
intentionalia the relevant mental states are about. Yet realizing that such objects are the same, 
which to me has to be accounted for in terms of a relation of sameness that is both different 
and weaker from ordinary identity, does involve cognitive phenomenology. For that realization 
must involve an ‘aha’-experience endowed with such a phenomenology of a proprietary kind.43 
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